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Predicting Organized Crime  
Francesco Calderoni 
 
In the last decade, the use of social network analysis in the study of organized crime has seen 
significant developments. Since the beginning of the 2000s, academic interest in this specific 
field has strongly increased and contributed to opening new research directions in the study 
of criminal organizations (e.g. Natarajan 2006; Morselli, Giguère, and Petit 2007; Malm, 
Bichler, and Van De Walle 2009; Bouchard and Nguyen 2010; Bright, Hughes, and Chalmers 
2012; Varese 2012; Calderoni 2012; Mancuso 2013). Among the most important contribu-
tions of these studies is the demonstrated importance of brokers within criminal organiza-
tions. Brokers are individuals that are capable of linking people, information and other re-
sources. Brokering skills are extremely important for individuals to be successful  in a num-
ber illegal markets and activities (Burt 1992; Morselli 2005; Morselli 2009a; Morselli et al. 
2013). In criminal networks, brokers are frequently identified through betweenness centrality, 
a measure capturing how often an individual is positioned between two other nodes (Morselli 
2009a, 39). These subjects are often in the position to better exploit opportunities for a suc-
cessful criminal career (e.g., Morselli 2005).  
Despite this important development, criminal justice practitioners are still reticent to 
use social network analysis in organized crime cases. This methodology is not yet established 
as a standard instrument in tactical and strategic analyses. A possible cause of this skepticism 
may be that many of the prior studies applying SNA to organized crime analyzed data from 
phone wiretaps. To secure a wiretap, agencies must already have an understanding of the 
crime group, as such little investigative aid may be gained from analysis of intercepted com-
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munications. From this perspective social network analysis may offer little insight to opera-
tors working daily on the case when the most strategically positioned individuals, those with 
highest brokering potential, wind up being the “usual suspects” already identified by law en-
forcement (Morselli et al. 2013). However, the social network analysis of other specific be-
haviors, instead of phone communications, may provide a different perspective to both schol-
ars and the law enforcement in the analysis of organized crime. Using data other than phone 
wiretaps may uncover other relevant patterns who may have escaped the attention of the au-
thorities.  
The analysis of meeting attendance within organized crime organizations may be a rela-
tively simple example of such new perspective. Meeting attendance data could be more easily 
accessible than wiretaps. For example, procedural requirements to shadow suspects or moni-
tor public places (e.g. bars, restaurants, parks) are less constraining. The application of social 
network analysis to meeting data may provide insights into the functioning of a criminal net-
work with a limited investment, not only in terms of procedural requirements but also in fi-
nancial terms. At the same time, meeting participation may be an important element of the 
life of a criminal organization.  
The analysis of meeting attendance may prove particularly informative when investi-
gating traditional organized crime groups characterized by established hierarchies and “local” 
criminal activities (e.g. extortion, criminal protection, and corruption) (Kleemans 2007). At-
tendance to meetings may be indicative of an individual’s affiliation and role, or change in 
social status (Paoli 2002, 2003) Also, organized crime is often embedded in family, kinship 
and ethnic connections (van de Bunt and Kleemans 1999; Papachristos and Smith 2011). 
Therefore the analysis may also include social occasions such as religious ceremonies (e.g. 
baptisms, weddings, and funerals), family celebrations (e.g. birthday parties) and community 
events (tow or neighborhood festivities).  
Meeting attendance may also provide important information on the internal structure of 
a criminal group. In criminal networks, the most important players may take precautions 
against over exposition to phone communications to reduce the risk of interception. They 
may manage the criminal activities thanks to their status or more indirect forms of control. 
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Individuals more active on the phone may be middle level criminals which then report to the 
bosses (Morselli 2009b; Calderoni 2012). Similarly, Bright and colleagues, analyzing meth-
amphetamine networks constructed from judges’ sentencing comments, argued that network 
centrality does not always correspond to leadership (2012, 172). The analysis of meetings 
may penetrate these countermeasures and provide important information for the identification 
of the criminal leaders, which may be the target of specific crime prevention efforts.  
Despite the possible advantages of the analysis of meetings, to date no study has ap-
plied network analysis methods on organized crime meeting patterns. This chapter aims to fill 
this gap, exploring individuals’ participation in meetings in a large organized crime group, 
and verifying whether network analysis of meeting attendance can produce results relevant 
for both criminal investigations and crime prevention. This study addresses questions such 
“can social network analysis of meetings identify the importance of individuals within an 
organized group?”, “if yes, what network measures better identify leaders from other partici-
pants?”, “can social network analysis of meetings provide information before the end of the 
investigation, and, if so, when and how?”, and “how can the prediction of criminal leadership 
contribute to prevent criminal networks to operate?”  
To address these issues, this chapter analyzes a single case study, Operation Infinito. 
This investigation targeted a large organized crime group called the ‘Ndrangheta, an Italian 
mafia from Calabria, Southern Italy. This case study has relevance outside Italy because a 
number of sources report that this criminal organization has already established formally 
structured groups outside its region of origin (Paoli 2003; Forgione 2009; KLPD 2011; Tran-
scrime 2013; Campana 2013). Therefore, in addition to testing the utility of social network 
analysis of data other than phone wiretaps, the results of this study may provide insights on 
the functioning of a criminal organization which has expanded in a number of different coun-
tries. 
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Leadership roles in the ‘Ndrangheta 
The ‘Ndrangheta is a mafia from Calabria, a Southern region at the tip of the Italian boot. It 
originated in the Nineteenth Century, or even before that period according to some sources 
(Ciconte 1992; Gratteri and Nicaso 2009, 25). Until recently, the ‘Ndrangheta received less 
attention than the Cosa Nostra, widely considered as the archetypical mafia organization 
(Paoli 1994). Some recent events have brought the Calabrian syndicate into the world media 
spotlight.
i
 In particular, the ‘Ndrangheta has shown a remarkable capacity to establish its 
presence outside Calabria. A recent report estimated its yearly revenues from illegal activities 
at €3.5 bn, of which only 23% from original Calabria and nearly 60% from richer Northern 
regions (Piedmont, Lombardy, Emilia-Romagna, Lazio and Liguria) (Transcrime 2013, 80). 
Also, a number of sources report the presence of the ‘Ndrangheta in other nations (e.g. Aus-
tralia, Canada, Germany and the Netherlands) (Ciconte and Macrì 2009; Forgione 2009; 
KLPD 2011; Campana 2013). As a consequence, law enforcement agencies and institutions 
have increasingly dedicated attention to this criminal organization.
ii
  
The organizational structure of the ‘Ndrangheta may be one of the possible factors of 
this successful expansion. Blood and community ties, rituals, affiliation ceremonies, mythol-
ogy and a hierarchy comprising a number formal ranks (doti) and offices (cariche) strengthen 
the trust among the members, even at a great distance from the motherland (Paoli 2003; 
KLPD 2011).
iii
  
The ‘Ndrangheta is primarily based on the blood kinship  (Paoli 2003; Varese 2006b). 
It is very common for men of the same family to join the organization, differently from Cosa 
Nostra where the “family” was actually a group of different individuals which rarely shared 
the same blood (there was even a rule against accepting more than two blood relatives in a 
Cosa Nostra family) (Arlacchi 1992; Paoli 2003, 31). One or several ‘Ndrangheta families in 
the same area, frequently connected also by marriages, godfathering and similar social ties, 
form a‘ndrina. The ‘ndrine from the same area may form a locale, an autonomous criminal 
organization with control over a specific territory (Paoli 2007, 856).  
The ‘Ndrangheta also has a formal structure made of ranks (doti) and offices (cariche) 
(Paoli 2003, 46). Competition for advancement in the hierarchy is fierce and concern over the 
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criminal career is a constant element of the life of a ‘ndranghetista. Affiliates frequently dis-
cuss matters relating to ranks and offices. Information on the formal organization is frag-
mented, despite the discovery of written “regulations” and informant descriptions of  the rules 
of the organization (Gratteri and Nicaso 2009; Malafarina 1978; Paoli 2003). The ‘Ndran-
gheta keeps evolving and the number of ranks and offices have increased, possibly due to the 
internal pressure to climb the criminal career. 
In general, every affiliate holds a specific rank (dote) within the organization. The ranks 
are a sort of internal career for the members. Indeed, the dote indicates each affiliate’s status 
within the ‘Ndrangheta.iv While the lower levels have remained constant through the years, 
the last decades saw the creation of new higher ranks (Paoli 2003, 42–44). As a result, today 
there is a division of the members in two main tiers: the higher society (società maggiore) 
and lower society (società minore), with multiple ranks within each society (Paoli 2003).
v
  
Each locale has a number of formal offices (cariche), tasked with specific functions. 
Offices are assigned to higher ranked affiliates: 
 The boss of the locale is the capobastone or capolocale.  
 The contabile (accountant) is responsible for the common fund of the locale, 
the crimine (crime) oversees criminal, and particularly violent, actions. 
 The mastro di giornata (literally “master of the day”) takes care of the commu-
nication flows within the locale.  
Information is incomplete as to the offices, with investigations uncovering new offices 
and functions. In general, however, the number of offices is smaller, possibly to avoid over-
laps in competences. For example, one internal rule requires every affiliate to state the names 
of the three main offices (the “copiata”) of his locale (capobastone, crimine and contabile) 
whenever he presents himself to members of other groups. 
 
Case study 
This study focused on one large judicial case, Operation Infinito, named after one of the new 
ranks in the ‘Ndrangheta discovered during the investigation. Infinito dates back to 2006, 
 6 
with the start of different criminal investigations on the ‘Ndrangheta in Lombardy. These 
were subsequently joined and concluded on 13 July 2010, when the authorities arrested more 
than 160 individuals. To date, the trials are still ongoing.
vi
 The case concerned the establish-
ment of several ‘Ndrangheta locali in the area around Milan, the capital city of the Lombardy 
region, Italy’s second largest city and economic capital. The data sources include a number of 
judicial documents-- law enforcement agencies reports, pretrial detention orders, and first and 
second grade judgments. 
The main theme of Infinito was the vicissitudes of a special ‘Ndrangheta structure 
called la Lombardia (Lombardy in Italian) and of the person charged with its management, 
the Mastro generale della Lombardia (general master of Lombardy). Although the function-
ing of this body is still unclear, it seems that la Lombardia was a sort of coordination cham-
ber among the locali based in Lombardy, but also with some role in the relations between 
these and the main locali in Calabria. At the beginning of the investigation, N161 was the 
leader of la Lombardia.
vii
 However, he showed excessive autonomy from the powerful Ca-
labrian locali, by pressing for more independence for the Northern affiliates in the manage-
ment of the criminal activities and in awarding of ranks and offices. As a reaction, the locali 
from Calabria ordered his murder, which took place on 15 July 2008, in a bar in San Vittore 
Olona, a town about 30 km from Milan. After N161’s murder, the dominant Calabrian fami-
lies decided to suspend the office of Mastro generale della Lombardia and appointed a tem-
porary manager, N099. Eventually, after several machinations concerning the vacant office, 
N157 was appointed as Mastro generale on 31 October 2009.  
One of the salient characteristics of Operation Infinito is that the main offence charged 
is participation in a mafia-type association (Article 416-bis of the Italian Criminal Code). 
This offence criminalizes the participation in any association, whatever its origin, which uses 
the so-called mafia method. The key elements of the latter are:  
 the intimidatory power deriving from the strength of the associative bond,  
 the condition of subjection and  
 of omertà or silence.  
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Due to this charge, the investigation aimed at demonstrating the stable presence of a 
mafia-type association in the area around Milan. The account of the struggle for the office of 
Mastro generale della Lombardia and the reconstruction of the offices of the locali in the 
area were crucial in proving the existence of a mafia-type association. Consequently, most of 
the investigative activities, from background checks to wiretaps and surveillance activities 
focused on describing the organizational structure of the ‘Ndrangheta with a particular con-
cern in charting the hierarchy of la Lombardia and the different locali present in the region.viii
 
 
 
Data Source 
The primary data  source for this study was the pretrial detention order issued by the prelimi-
nary investigation judge (Giudice per le indagini preliminari, henceforth GIP) of Milan upon 
request by the prosecution (Tribunale di Milano 2011). This judicial document containing 
more than 700 pages, petitions to restrict the suspects’ freedom, and in particular of remand-
ing some of them in custody or pretrial detention. Since the law requires the judge to moti-
vate her decision the document provides a wealth of information for the analysis of criminal 
groups and their criminal activities:  
 It reports personal details of the suspects (e.g. name, birth date, residence, citizenship) 
and of the crimes (for every crime, e.g. extortion, they record the date, the place, the 
participants and the modi operandi).  
 It provides details on the structure of the organization, the roles played by each mem-
ber, and the evolution of the group during the investigation.  
 It reports excerpts from intercepted telephone conversations and meetings observed or 
reconstructed by the investigators. Some of these meetings occurred in houses, private 
premises (e.g. warehouses) or cars, others in public places (e.g. bars, restaurants or 
public parks). 
 
This study analyzed and coded each meeting mentioned in the court order.
ix
 In total, the 
document provides information about 308 individuals participating in 574 of such meetings 
between mid-2006 and the beginning of 2010. The number of participants per meeting varied 
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considerably, with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 25 identified individuals. In most cas-
es, the law enforcement agencies were able to identify all or most of the participants.  
Given the specific focus of the investigation, most of the meetings reported in the court 
order were true organized crime meetings. These had the purpose of discussing criminal ac-
tivities or matters relating to the life of the different locali (e.g. affiliations, attribution of 
ranks and offices) or of la Lombardia (including the vicissitudes of N161, his murder, the 
suspension of the office and the appointment of N157 as the new Mastro generale della 
Lombardia).
x
  
To be included in this study, the meeting had to involve at least four participants. The 
selection criterion serves to remove from the sample the smallest meetings and the most mar-
ginal actors. The inclusion of the latter may have biased the sample towards those individuals 
more intensely controlled by the law enforcement, e.g. because their cars were wiretapped 
(meetings in cars often involved only two or three participants).
xi
 Further, this kind of sam-
pling procedure is frequent in studies applying a social network analysis methods to criminal 
groups (Natarajan 2000; Natarajan 2006; Morselli 2009b, 152).  
The sample of selected meetings included a total of 215 individuals participating in 129 
meetings. With only 22% of the 574 meetings recorded in judicial documents, the sample 
comprised nearly 70% of the total participants.. Most participants were made members of the 
‘Ndrangheta, a further proof of the organized crime nature of the meetings. In some cases, 
however, the authorities could not verify the actual affiliation of some individuals. These sub-
jects may have been actually affiliated to the organization, or associates not yet admitted in 
the ‘Ndrangheta, or external individuals who may participate or not in the criminal activities. 
Also, some individuals were not affiliated to the organization. In such cases, these individuals 
may have personal (e.g. family, friendship) or business (either legal or illegal) connections 
with the ‘Ndrangheta and for this they were included in the network.   
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Table 6.1 Actors-to-meetings and actor-to-actor networks 
Network Descriptive statistics 
a) Actors-to-meetings Network (2 mode)   
 
 
Meetings (black squares): 129 
Individuals (grey circles): 215 
Density (2-mode): 3.1% 
Avg. path length (2-mode): 4.6 
b) Derived Actor-to-Actor network (1 mode) 
 
 
Leaders (black): 33 
Non-leaders (grey): 182 
Avg. degree: 34 
Density: 8.8% 
Avg. path length: 2.5 
 
 
Participants and meetings were entered into a two-mode, affiliation matrix (upper graph 
in Table 6.1). From this, a one-mode, valued and undirected adjacency matrix was computed, 
recording each individual’s co-participation in meetings with any other individual in the net-
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work (lower graph in Table 6.1). All network analysis operations were performed using the 
Ucinet 6 (Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002). 
The network was partitioned into four networks representing investigatory time periods 
of increasing duration (Figure 6.1 and Table 6.2). Since the meeting date was available for 
118 out of the 129 meetings in the sample, the final time period includes all but 11 meetings. 
The 118 meetings took place between 25 June 2007 and 14 February 2010, although 110 
(93%) events occurred between February 2008 and October 2009. These subdivisions help to 
assess the network measures’ predictive capacity of the leadership in the criminal organiza-
tion at different points throughout an investigation. Each period starts in June 2007 with the 
first meeting in the sample.  
Two-mode affiliation matrixes were calculated for each time period. This enabled deri-
vation of one-mode adjacency matrixes recording individuals’ co-participation in meetings. 
The affiliation matrixes (both the first one for the whole investigation and the four period 
matrixes) enabled the calculation of a number of social network measures (all based on a bi-
nary matrix, except for valued degree centrality).  
Figure 6.1  Number of Meetings per Month and Period  
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
IV 
III 
II 
I 
 11 
 
 
Table 6.2  Descriptive Statistics of the Four Time Periods  
 
I II III IV 
End date (from 25 
Jun 2007) 
30 Jun 2008 31 Dec 2008 30 Jun 2009 28 Feb 2010 
No. months 13 19 25 33 
No. meetings 34 53 93 118 
No. nodes 82 126 183 205 
Of which leaders 27 31 33 33 
 
Measures 
Independent Variables. Given the lack of previous studies on meeting attendance in criminal 
networks, the analysis opted for an exploratory approach, calculating the centrality measures 
most frequently used in the literature. These include degree (on both binary and valued ma-
trixes), betweenness and closeness centrality, three classic measures of centrality developed 
by Freeman and frequently used in the literature on criminal network (Freeman 1979; Baker 
and Faulkner 1993; Morselli 2009a).
xii
 Other measures are eigenvector centrality, an adapta-
tion of degree taking into account the degree of the a node’s contacts (i.e. neighborhood) 
(Bonacich 1972; Morselli 2009a) and the clustering coefficient, a measure of the level of in-
terconnection among a node’s neighborhood (Watts 1992; Morselli 2009a; Calderoni 
2011).
xiii
 Table 6.3 reports the minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation for each 
variable. 
Leadership Role. A dichotomous dependent variable “leadership,” was created from in-
formation provided in the court documents.
xiv
 This variable records whether each subject held 
one of the main offices within the locali or the Lombardia or not (leader=1 and other=0). 
Among the 215 individuals in the sample of meetings for the whole investigation, 33 subjects 
had a leadership office and 182 are simple members of the ‘Ndrangheta (n=135), unidentified 
(n=43) or not formally affiliated (n=4). Leaders included in the four time periods are reported 
in Table 6.2. 
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Analytic Process 
The statistical analysis consisted of two modeling procedures.  First, a logistic regression was 
conducted using network information developed from all meetings. As previously noted, the 
dependent dichotomous variable was leadership. Independent variables included the above 
mentioned individual network measures and two controls (Table 6.3). The first is the number 
of meetings attended for each individual. Second, to control for a possible prosecution bias, a 
dummy was included (mafia charge), assessing whether each node was investigated for the 
offence of mafia-type association (data extracted from the court order). Given the exploratory 
nature of the analysis, the model used a forward stepwise selection method among all the var-
iables.  
Table 6.3  Descriptive Statistics and Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients of the Vari-
ables for the Network Generated from All Meetings*  
 Variable Min Max Mean St.Dev. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Leadership 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.4         
2 Meetings Attended 1.0 38.0 4.0 5.0 -  .822 .940 .789 .487 .681 -.742 .862 
3 Degree (Normalised) 1.4 38.8 8.8 7.5   -  .940 .635 .541 .946 -.725 .940 
4 Valued Degree 3.0 221.0 31.1 38.4     -  .699 .531 .854 -.710 .951 
5 Betweenness (Normalised) 0.0 15.2 0.7 2.0        - .370 .480 -.624 .714 
6 Closeness (raw scores) 55.1 144.6 95.0 17.9         -  .506 -.470 .511 
7 Eigenvector (Normalised) 0.0 32.0 6.6 7.1           -  -.570 .863 
8 Clustering Coefficient 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.2             -  -.642 
9 Number of Pairs 3.0 3403.0 294.3 520.8        - 
10 Mafia Charge 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.5         
*all correlations are statistically significant at p<.01 level 
The second step involved running four logistic regression models, one for each time peri-
ods, using the leadership as dependent variable. The independent variables were calculated on 
the network partitions for each time period and their selection and were selected on the basis 
of the results of the regression for the whole investigation (all meetings). The two controls 
were also included (no. of meetings attended and mafia charges). Several attempts with all 
the above mentioned centrality measures provided similar results, ensuring the robustness of 
the models.  
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Results 
The logistic regression model using data from all meetings successfully predicts the 
leadership positions of 92.6% of individuals (66.7% for leaders and 97.3% for others). The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test for goodness of fit indicates that model fits the data acceptably (χ2 
15.344, p<.53, df =8).
xv
 Nagelkerke’s R2 is of .641, which reveals a good capacity of the pre-
dictors to identify the role of the participants. 
The stepwise selection retained only valued degree (at first step) and betweenness (in-
cluded at the second step) as independent variables (Table 6.4). The controls and the other 
variables were not included by the selection method. Betweenness centrality has an odds ratio 
of 2.565 (95% confidence interval 1.482-4.439) with p<.001, indicating that higher value of 
this measure increases the probability of identifying a leader (approximately +156% per unit 
increase of betweenness, keeping the variable valued degree constant). Valued degree has 
also a positive association with being in a position of leadership (OR 1.037, 95% CI 1.018-
1.056, equal to an increased probability to be a leader of approximately +4% per unit of val-
ued degree, irrespective of the value of betweenness).  
Table 6.4  Results of the Logistic Regression on Leadership for the All Meetings 
Predictor B SE OR 
Valued degree .036 .009 1.037*** 
Betweenness (normalised) .942 .280 2.565** 
Constant -4.261 .544 .014*** 
*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
The logistic regressions for the four time periods demonstrate a significant capacity to 
predict the leadership role even at early stages of the investigation. The share of successful 
predictions is always above the one of a constant-only model (Table 6.5).  
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Table 6.5  Percent of Successful Predictions from the Logistic Regressions on Lead-
ership for the Four Time Periods 
  
I II III IV 
Constant only 67.1 75.4 82 83.9 
Full model 75.6 84.9 90.7 92.2 
 
Others 90.9 94.7 98 97.7 
 
Leaders 44.4 54.8 57.6 63.6 
 
The first time period (until mid-2008) provides successful identification for 75.6% the 
nodes, with only 34 meetings and 82 individuals in the network. Analysis of the meetings 
until the end of 2008 further increases the success rate (approximately 85%), with a signifi-
cant increase in the identification of the leaders (54.8%). The third and fourth periods provide 
successful predictions (90.7% and 92.2% respectively) very close to the whole investigation 
model (92.6%).  
The Hosmer-Lemeshow tests show that all the four models fit the data. Nagelkerke’s R2 
increases in time, indicating that the regressions’ predictive capacities grow with the number 
of meetings and nodes in the sample. Significantly, the fourth period’s model has a 
Nagelkerke’s R2 of .657, slightly above the whole investigation model (Table 6.6).  
 15 
Table 6.6  Results of the Logistic Regressions on Leadership for the Four Time Peri-
ods 
Time period Variables B SE OR 
I 
(June 2007 to  
30 June 2008)  
Valued Degree .001 .025 1.001 
Betweenness (normalised) .614 .359 1.848! 
No. Meetings .116 .238 1.123 
Mafia Charge 1.735 1.092 5.671 
 
Constant -3.105 1.058 .045** 
 H-L Test χ
2
= 3.498 p=.899    
 
Nagelkerke’s R
2
=.387 
 
   
II 
(June 2007 to  
31 Dec. 2008) 
Valued Degree .008 .024 1.008 
Betweenness (normalised) .833 .359 2.300* 
No. Meetings .077 .217 1.080 
 
Mafia Charge 1.820 1.084 6.170! 
 
Constant -3.866 1.026 .021*** 
 H-L Test χ
2
= 7.747 p=.459    
 
Nagelkerke’s R
2
=.515 
 
   
III 
(June 2007 to  
30 June 2009) 
Valued Degree .024 .018 1.024 
Betweenness (normalised) .691 .264 1.996** 
No. Meetings -.068 .168 .934 
Mafia Charge 2.173 1.080 8.787* 
 
Constant -4.638 1.016 .010*** 
 H-L Test χ
2
= 3.861 p=.896    
 
Nagelkerke’s R
2
=.559 
 
   
IV 
(June 2007 to  
28 Feb. 2010) 
Valued Degree .044 .019 1.044* 
Betweenness (normalised) .898 .309 2.454** 
No. Meetings -.132 .155 .876 
 
Mafia Charge 1.731 1.108 5.648 
 
Constant -5.180 1.033 .006*** 
 H-L Test χ
2
= 6.066 p=.640    
 Nagelkerke’s R
2
=.657    
!p<.1,*p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001;  
Betweenness centrality is the main predictor of the nodes’ leadership position, showing 
a statistically significant strong positive effect on the probability of being a leader (Table 
6.6). In the first period it shows an odds ratio of 1.8. However, its statistical significance is 
very low (p<.1), probably due to the low number of observations (n=82) and to an overall 
low predictive power of the model (Nagelkerke’s R2=.387). In the three following periods 
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betweenness is always statistically significant and its odds ratios high (2.3, 2 and 2.4, respec-
tively). This implies that a unit increase of betweenness, all other variables equal, increases 
the probability of being a leader by 130%, 100% and 140% respectively. Valued degree is 
statistically significant only in the fourth period with an OR of 1.04, in line with the whole 
investigation model. Among the control variables, the number of meetings is never signifi-
cant, while mafia charge is significant and strongly positive only in the third and fourth peri-
od. Nevertheless, this does not affect the statistical significance and the sign of the effect of 
betweenness centrality.  
 
Discussion 
The results show that the analysis of the meetings within an organized crime group can 
correctly identify the leadership positions of the participants. These findings demonstrate that 
the meeting attendance may provide insight into the internal organization of a criminal net-
work, overcoming the limitations associated with the analysis of telephone communications. 
Also, the regression for the different time periods indicate that successful prediction may be 
possible also during the course of an investigation. These results may enable the adoption of 
preventive measures with the aim of hindering the activities of criminal organizations.  
Betweenness centrality is the measure which better predicts the leadership roles. In this 
case, the variable reveals that the leaders participate in the network with a specific strategy. 
Betweenness measures the capacity of leaders to meet individuals who do not meet each oth-
er in other occasions. This is consistent with the specific role that individuals holding im-
portant offices within the ‘Ndrangheta may fulfill. Mafia leaders are both tasked with im-
portant decisions about the activities of their locale, or the organization as a whole, and with 
a number of formal or “ceremonial” activities, including attendance at special events. For 
example, leaders may participate in high-level meetings reserved for leaders or visit other 
locali as a sign of respect. The inclusion of valued degree centrality in the whole investiga-
tion model is more intuitive. Leaders tend to meet other participants more frequently. Also, 
the variable is strongly correlated with other direct connectivity variables (number of meet-
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ings attended, binary degree centrality and the number of pairs). This is a natural conse-
quence of the fact that the leaders were participating in more meetings.
xvi
  
The importance of betweenness is consistent with existing literature on criminal net-
works. Betweenness centrality reflects a broker role within a criminal network, i.e. the capac-
ity to bring different resources together. Brokering skills are crucial to the success of criminal 
careers in a number illegal markets and activities, including organized crime (Burt 1992; 
Morselli 2003; Morselli 2005; Morselli 2009a). In a number of criminal networks, high be-
tweenness centrality was typical of the leaders of the criminal groups (Morselli 2009b; Vare-
se 2013; Morselli and Roy 2008). However, while brokering is frequently a crucial element 
for success, it does not always mirror actual leadership within a criminal group. In larger and 
more structured criminal groups, there may be multiple organizational layers. For example, a 
study on two mafia groups involved in drug trafficking demonstrated that high betweenness 
centrality was associated with individuals directly managing smuggling operations, but not 
with the highest criminal status in the organizations. High status actors remained distant from 
everyday trafficking activity to reduce the risk of detection (Calderoni 2012). This may be 
due to the fact that mafias adapt to the rules of drug markets, adopting flexible organizational 
structures (Paoli 2002). The formal roles are less relevant and the management of trafficking 
is delegated to middle status members, who may see this as a career opportunity within the 
group. This pattern does not show up in the present case study. 
In Infinito, the meeting network mirrors the “institutional” life of a mafia, where offices 
are an important issue, object of frequent discussions and occasional disputes. The leaders 
cannot delegate to others some of the most important tasks relating to the functioning of the 
organization, which includes attending certain meetings. For this reason, the meetings in In-
finito may reflect the political maneuvering of leaders more closely than studies analyzing 
phone communications and drug trafficking.  
The findings of this study may point out a specific social structure within organized 
crime groups. Active participation in meetings appears as a crucial requirement for leaders of 
organized crime groups. On the one side, attendance at specific meetings may grant leader a 
strategic position, providing access to precious resources and placing them in ideal brokerage 
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positions. For the leaders of large criminal groups, this is an important opportunity to main-
tain control over the illicit activities. On the other side, opportunities may turn into vulnera-
bilities, since meeting participation can hardly be dissimulated, enabling the identification of 
leaders through network analysis methods.  
The results of the regressions for the four time periods point out that it is possible to 
successfully identify the leadership roles even in the early stage of an investigation, with ac-
ceptable rates of success even from the first stages of a case. Despite the low number of ob-
servations, betweenness centrality scores improve the correct classification of individuals’ 
leadership roles from the first observed meetings. The regression for the first time period cor-
rectly classified more than 75% individuals based on only 34 meetings (28% of the total). 
Analysis of the meetings until the end of 2008 (45%) yielded even better results, with nearly 
85% of success. With the third (mid-2009) and fourth (beginning of 2010) periods, the prob-
ability already reaches the one of the whole investigation model. The four models are more 
effective in the identification of non-leaders. Only from the second period the success rate for 
the leaders exceeds 50%, reaching a maximum of approximately 64% in the fourth period. 
This may be probably influenced by the low number of leaders in the sample (33 out of 205 
in the fourth period). 
These outcomes may be relevant from a law enforcement perspective. The analysis of 
meeting attendance may suggest on which suspects concentrate law enforcement resources, 
which are frequently limited by definition; it may prompt increased surveillance, background 
checks and other actions to verify and improve the prediction. Also, since phone interceptions 
are often restricted by legal requirements and resources availability, the analysis of meetings 
may provide a more accessible alternative or complementary strategy. As an alternative tac-
tic, it may help in the reconstruction of the internal structure of a group. As a complementary 
strategy, since wiretaps require judicial authorization and courts may be particularly demand-
ing whenever the suspects’ freedoms are at stake, the analysis of meetings may assist in the 
selection of the best targets for interceptions, so that the law enforcement may prioritize evi-
dence to authorize wiretaps of the possible leaders.  
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The identification of criminal leaders may also enable the adoption of crime prevention 
measures in line with the techniques of situational crime prevention (Clarke 1983). Although 
most frequently applied to volume/conventional crimes, situational crime prevention 
measures are increasingly considered for the preventing organized crime (van de Bunt and 
van der Schoot 2003; Bullock, Clarke, and Tilley 2010). In this field a number of strategies 
fall within the administrative approach to organized crime, which dates back to the non-
criminal tactics adopted in New York City to remove Cosa Nostra’s control of different in-
dustries (Jacobs, Friel, and Raddick 1999). The possible preventive measures aim at making 
it more difficult for criminal leaders to participate in the activities of the mafias and particu-
larly to meet other members. Given the nature local nature of the activities of some organized 
crime groups, administrative approach may prove particularly effective in preventing their 
functioning (Kleemans 2007).  
The Italian legislation (Legislative Decree 6 settembre 2011, n. 159, also known as An-
timafia Code) currently provides for non-criminal preventive measures against individuals 
suspected of a number of criminal activities and who may be dangerous for public order and 
security. Preventive measures are applied either by the head of the State Police of a province 
(Questore) or by a judicial authority upon request by law enforcement or prosecution agen-
cies. The procedure is administrative and aims at the imposition of personal or patrimonial 
restrictions, but not of criminal penalties. Individuals suspected of belonging to a mafia-type 
association are among the most typical target of these measures.  
The main personal preventive measure is the sorveglianza speciale di pubblica sicurez-
za (special surveillance of public security), which can last from one up to five years. When 
applying the special surveillance, the court can impose a number of prescription to the target-
ed person. These include the duty to communicate to the authorities the residence and domi-
cile and any changes to these; to live honestly, abiding the law, and not to leave home with-
out informing the police; not to associate with people convicted  or targeted by similar pre-
ventive measures; not to carry weapons. The court can also impose any other prescription 
considered useful for preventing criminal activities by the targeted person. If other preventive 
measures are not sufficient to ensure public security, the court can also impose the obligation 
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to live in the municipality of residence or domicile. The imposition of special surveillance 
entails that the targeted individuals cannot participate in public procurement contracts, cannot 
receive authorization or subsidies from the state. Also, the prosecution can request the inter-
ception of telephone or electronic communications to ensure that the individual is fulfilling 
with the imposed obligations and is not protracting the suspect behaviors. Violation of the 
prescriptions imposed by the court is punishable as a misdemeanor, with deprivation of liber-
ty from three months to one year. If the violation concerns the obligation of residence or 
domicile, it is a felony punishable with imprisonment from one up to five years. If the target-
ed person commits an offence (including the participation in, or the direction of, a mafia-type 
association) the penalties for the offence are increased from one third up to an half.  
The analysis of meeting participation may provide the competent authorities with rele-
vant information about potential optimal targets for applying for special surveillance orders. 
Once possible leaders are identified, it may be possible to collect evidence to satisfy the court 
that an individual suspected of belonging to the mafia should be imposed special surveillance.  
The special surveillance regime may make it harder for the targeted subjects to success-
fully manage a criminal organization. The effects of special surveillance are indeed amenable 
to the different situational crime prevention approaches and particularly to increasing the ef-
fort, increasing the risk and removing excuses. These include:  
 Increased awareness of the authorities’ attention and of the risk of detection and ar-
rest. This is likely to remove excuses for continuing illegal activities.   
 Individuals are obliged to inform the authorities of their residence and domicile, mak-
ing them more vulnerable in case of arrest and search.  
 The prohibition to meet with other affiliates would make it more difficult and riskier 
for the targets of special surveillance to meet with their associates. Given the consid-
erations above on the vital importance of meeting attendance for organized crime 
leaders, the restriction may significantly increase the efforts and risks for effectively 
managing criminal groups. 
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 The possibility to intercept telephone or electronic communications of the targeted 
subjects will increase the efforts and the risks for devising alternative methods for the 
management of the criminal groups.  
 The penalties for the violations of the obligations imposed by the court and the signif-
icant aggravation of penalties in case of conviction for a number of offences may in-
crease the risks for the targeted individuals.  
 
Limitations 
It is often argued that studies based on judicial sources are inevitably biased by the strategies 
of the law enforcement. Judicial investigations may have a partial coverage of criminal 
groups and this may affect the reliability of the network measures. For example, for a few 
locali the authorities identified a limited number of ‘Ndrangheta members. This problem is 
common to most network studies of criminal organizations and requires particular care in the 
handling of data. Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that this should not affect the re-
sults of this study. Some studies found that criminal network measures are strong even if ran-
domly tested for missing data (Xu and Chen 2008, 63–64; Morselli 2009a, 48). Furthermore, 
Infinito was a long investigation, specifically aiming to identify the most important individu-
als in the ‘Ndrangheta in Lombardy.  The risk that possible missed or excluded individuals 
may have radically changed the structure of the network appears low. For two reasons: (1) 
first and second grade judgments have confirmed the charges against the suspects, indicating 
that important actors were identified; and, (2) Berlusconi tested the robustness of degree and 
betweenness centrality across different phases of the judicial process (wiretap records, arrest 
warrant and judgment) and argued that “arrest warrants and judgments seem to be reliable 
data sources to identify key players regardless of whether a large proportion of peripheral 
nodes is missing” (Berlusconi 2013, 78). 
Another possible issue for the analysis is the correct identification of leaders. However, in 
Infinito, the identification of the leaders was based on direct evidence about the structure of 
the ‘Ndrangheta. The assessment was independent from the observation of meeting attend-
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ance and individuals’ activities. No individual was classified as leader due to the attendance 
at a specific meaning, since the court would have dismissed any such argument for lack of 
evidence. The evaluation therefore appears as the most reliable depiction of the actual leader-
ship roles within the criminal organization. In other studies, the reconstruction of the internal 
structure relied on the evaluation of the law enforcement or the court, or on individuals tasks 
or role in the criminal activities or on the content analysis of the conversations (Natarajan 
2000; Varese 2006a; Natarajan 2006; Morselli 2009a; Calderoni 2011; Calderoni 2012). Con-
trarily, this case study provides a valuable opportunity, enabling to explore how social net-
work measures may contribute to the identification of leadership positions, due to the inde-
pendence of the identification of the leaders by the authorities and their meeting attendance 
patterns. 
Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates that the analysis of meetings attendance can provide insights on 
the internal structure of organized crime. Betweenness centrality can predict the leadership 
role of the participants and who the leaders of the group are. The prediction is quite robust 
even in the first stages of the investigation. With only a few initial meetings, the analysis en-
ables to correctly assess the leadership of more than 3 out of four individuals. The model 
reaches increasingly high success rates as the case evolves in time with a peak of 92% of suc-
cessful predictions.  
These results have implications for the study of organized crime as well as network 
analysis. First, they show that specific behaviors may reveal the criminal status of the mem-
bers of organized crime. In a meeting network, and independently from the number of meet-
ings attended, the leaders have brokering positions, which give them access to criminal op-
portunities. Increasing or decreasing betweenness centrality in meetings may reveal a possi-
ble change in the opportunities available to an individual. This may help in identifying as-
cending or decaying criminals. Second, further studies may verify whether other criminal 
organizations, from terrorist groups to drug trafficking networks, show similar patterns when 
meeting attendance is concerned. For example, the relevance of such patterns may depend on 
the presence of any internal hierarchy. Conversely, the may be due to the characteristics of 
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the crimes. Local activities such as extortion, loan sharing, provision of criminal protection, 
and corruption may require active meeting participation, while transit crime, such as interna-
tional drug trafficking may necessarily rely more on telephone communications than on meet-
ings (Kleemans 2007). Third, the results point out the importance of the formal offices within 
organized criminal groups, even when they establish a presence far from the motherland. 
Given the international expansion of the ‘Ndrangheta, other studies may verify whether its 
relatively recent growth in other areas of the world also corresponds to the internal organiza-
tion observed in Infinito. 
This chapter may also have some interest for its law enforcement implications. It sug-
gests that it may be possible to successfully assess the leadership roles of the participants of a 
criminal organization through the analysis of the meetings. Leaders may be the target of spe-
cific preventive measures (such as the special surveillance provided by the Italian legisla-
tion), enabling the application of administrative approaches to prevent organized crime. Also, 
the prediction of leaders may support law enforcement agencies in developing intelligence for 
better action against criminal networks. While its operational effectiveness remains to be ver-
ified, it points out that network analysis of organized crime may still offer interesting devel-
opments for the law enforcement activity both from the crime prevention and the crime con-
trol perspective. 
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i
 The first event was the so-called ‘Duisburg massacre’ of 15 August 2007, when six people of Calabrian origin 
were murdered in Duisburg, Germany, in connection with a decade-long blood feud between two ‘ndrine 
(D’Emilio 2007; Landler and Fisher 2007; Spiegel Online International 2007; Williamson and Bompard 2007). 
Investigators found evidence of an affiliation ritual in the pocket of one of the victims (the remnants of a burned 
holy image), which further confirmed the tight relation between the massacre and the ‘Ndrangheta (McKenna 
2001). Second, on 30 May 2008 the President of the United States designated the ‘Ndrangheta as a significant 
foreign narcotics trafficker (to date, the only Italian mafia) and inserted it in a special list prompting a number of 
sanctions by U.S. authorities (OFAC 2012; U.S. Department of State 2011).. 
ii
 For example, in 2011, the Dutch Police issued a report on the ‘Ndrangheta, arguing that “no reliable statements 
can be made about the organizational structure in the Netherlands. It is likely that the ’Ndrangheta also applies 
the structure it uses in Calabria and elsewhere in the world in the Netherlands, which means that there are one or 
more locales that organize criminal activities” (KLPD 2011, 45). 
iii
 Indeed, neither Cosa Nostra nor the Camorra established a stable organized presence outside their regions and 
rather adopted more flexible structures. During the golden years of the 20
th
 century, only a few Cosa Nostra 
families were based outside Siciliy (Arlacchi 1992). A study on the Camorra clan La Torre highlighted that its 
presence in the Netherlands and Scotland was associated with money-laundering and participation in illegal 
markets. However, the core business of the group (criminal protection) remained in the region of origin (Cam-
pana 2011). 
iv
 The award of a new rank is a very important moment for each ‘ndranghetista, usually celebrated with a dinner 
or a party with the closest affiliates. Higher ranks can only be awarded by top ranked individuals, with the 
agreement of the most prominent figures in Calabria. 
v
 Before formally joining the ‘Ndrangheta, associates are called contrasto onorato. After their initiation, they 
start within the lower society which includes affiliates with lower ranks (picciotto, camorrista, sgarrista). The 
higher society comprises members who have reached higher ranks (santa, vangelo, quartino, tre quartino, quin-
tino, associazione and other ranks discovered in recent investigations). 
vi
 The Court of Milan issued two first grade judgments on 11 November 2011 and 6 December 2012, convicting 
most of the suspects. On 23 April 2013 the Court of Appeal of Milan confirmed the convictions of the first 
judgment. Further appeals and the third grade trials at the Cassation Court of Rome will follow in the next 
months. 
vii
 The study coded each individual in the court order as N001, N002, … to prevent identification. 
viii
 The investigation also uncovered a number of other crimes, ranging from extortion to usury, from corruption 
to the infiltration into public procurement. 
ix
 The study coded each meeting as E001, E002, etc., recording the meeting’s time, place and participants. 
x
 For example, on 31 October 2009, the law enforcement managed to film a ‘Ndrangheta meeting in Paderno 
Dugnano, a town approximately 10 Km from the centre of Milan. The meeting took place in a social club for 
elderly people entitled to Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, two judges killed by Cosa Nostra in 1992. 
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The meeting had the goal of appointing N157 as the new Mastro generale. 23 men sat at a horseshoe-shaped 
table, having dinner and discussing among them. The temporary manager N099 gave a speech and proposed 
N157. Afterwards, all the leaders of the locali approved the candidate, whose appointment was celebrated with a 
toast. 
xi
 Exploration of the full meeting dataset showed that, on average, leaders and non-leaders met with a similar 
number of individuals, although the frequency distribution of non-leaders was more skewed to the left (avg. 5.91 
st.dev. 2.68 for leaders and avg. 6.07 and st. dev. 5.68 for non leaders).  
xii
 Closeness was measured as the sum of the reciprocal of the geodesic distances so that the most central nodes 
have the highest score.  
xiii
 The clustering coefficient is strongly influenced by the size of a node’s neighborhood. With a high number of 
direct contacts, it is less likely that they will be densely connected. For this reason, the clustering coefficient is 
always presented along with the number of pairs (i.e. the number of possible combinations among a node’s di-
rect contacts).  
xiv
 The court order provided detailed information about the leadership positions among the ‘Ndrangheta groups 
in Lombardy. First, the investigation identified the individuals who led the coordination chamber la Lombardia, 
with the special office of Mastro generale della Lombardia. Second, the law enforcement also carefully charted 
the hierarchy of each locale. The court order reports detailed information about 17 locali in Lombardy and the 
membership of each of them. The investigation identified the leader of each locale (capolocale or capobastone) 
and, in the majority of cases, also the other main offices (caposocietà, contabile, crimine). The law enforcement 
and the prosecution based their assessment of the offices in each locale on different sources. These include evi-
dence from previous investigations and trials, but also, and more frequently, on the wiretaps of conversations 
among members of the ‘Ndrangheta. The offices within each locale were a frequent topic in the discussion of 
the suspects, also due to the particular period of stress which followed the murder of N161 and the competition 
for the appointment as new Mastro generale della Lombardia.  
 
xv
 The Hosmer and Lemeshow's (H-L) goodness of fit test divides subjects into deciles based on predicted prob-
abilities, then computes a X
2
 from observed and expected frequencies. Differently from the standard X
2
 test, the 
null hypothesis for the H-L test is that the two distributions are equal. Non-significant results accept the null 
hypothesis and suggest that the model correctly fit the data, since the predicted and observed frequency are sta-
tistically similar.  
xvi
 Test logistic regressions including betweenness centrality and the other direct connectivity measures provided 
results very similar to the model presented above 
